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Wireless networks are vulnerable to adversarial devices by spoofing the digital identity of valid
wireless devices, allowing unauthorized devices access to the network. Instead of validating devices
based on their digital identity, it is possible to use their unique "physical fingerprint" caused by
changes in the signal due to deviations in wireless hardware. In this thesis, the physical fingerprint
was validated by performing classification with complex-valued neural networks (NN), achieving
a high level of accuracy in the process. Additionally, zero-shot learning (ZSL) was implemented to
learn discriminant features to separate legitimate from unauthorized devices using outlier detection
and then further separate every unauthorized device into their own cluster. This approach allows
42% of unauthorized devices to be identified as unauthorized and correctly clustered
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Wireless networks identify devices by using a digital media access control (MAC) address,
which is intended to be unique for every device. This allows wireless networks to choose which
devices to allow access; however, this address can be easily mimicked, allowing unauthorized
devices access to the network.
Wireless devices also have a "physical fingerprint" which is less easily mimicked. This unique
identifier is caused by differences in the manufacturing of their hardware, leading to differences in
each device’s transmitted signal [16]. By using the physical fingerprint, MAC address mimicking
is avoided since the MAC address is no longer used for identification.
A wireless network may have several devices that are intended to be authorized, with all other
devices not being allowed on the network. When an authorized device tries to connect, the network
should allow access. When an unauthorized device tries the same, the network should not allow
access. Additionally, identifying and capturing inputs from unauthorized devices can be further
utilized for other purposes, such as localization of the unauthorized device. Wireless devices can be
separated and clustered using Zero-shot Learning (ZSL), where outlier detection is applied to these
wireless signals to separate authorized and unauthorized devices. These unauthorized devices are
then further clustered into their own set.
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The contributions in this work to the physical device fingerprinting research area are:
1. Four real and complex neural networks (NN) are implemented for classification of wireless
devices using their physical fingerprint. These networks showed state-of-the-art accuracy,
implying that the physical fingerprint is indeed a valid classification input which is more
robust than using the digital MAC address.
2. A ZSL method is implemented for the case of wireless physical fingerprints, which has not
been attempted before in the literature.
3. A wireless signal dataset containing 9 classes with approximately 100 samples each.
Beyond the research here and in Chapters 3 and 4, this work has been extended by classifying
long term evolution (LTE) signals and investigated the effect on classification for applying the
short time Fourier transform with varying filter sizes to wireless signals. Additional code and





Herein, an explanation of physical fingerprints is presented, alongside an overview of NNs used
in this document and a review of the ZSL literature.
2.1 Physical Fingerprinting
When a wireless device is communicating to a receiver using a wireless protocol, MAC address
identification occurs in the data link layer. The signal is originally obtained in the physical layer
before being passed to the data link layer. By focusing on the signal obtained in the physical layer,
the physical fingerprint of the device can be captured. This fingerprint is unique to that device due
to differences in the analog circuitry of every device when they are manufactured [16], which is
shown in differences in transmissions in the physical layer.
There have been several methods that have already utilized physical fingerprinting to increase
robustness. The transient of the signal has been utilized [27], as well as the power [45], and the
wavelet transform [28], and the magnitude and phase of each signal [48]. Dimensionality reduction
of the data was implemented using principal component analysis [41] as well as autoencoders (AE)
[51]. A comparison between using high-end and low-end receivers has also been employed [44].
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2.2 WiFi
WiFi refers to a class of IEE 802.11 network protocols which allow wireless devices to connect
to access points and the Internet. The most common radio bands used are 2.4 gigahertz (GHz) and
5 GHz. Data sent over these bands are formatted into 802.11 frames, using the MAC address when
sending over a local area network (LAN).
2.3 Neural Networks
NNs are a collection of neurons that learn through training on a dataset. Given sufficient
depth and appropriate non-linearities, NNs can learn any continuous function to any given desired
precision [15]. This has allowed intellectual work to be offloaded onto NNs, saving time and
even allowing superhuman performance. NNs have been shown to control a manned aircraft after
simulated damage affecting maneuverability has occurred [25]. They have been used to analyze
nuclear sites and their economic impact [36]. The medical field has made use of NNs for the
purpose of sleep analysis [49] and decision making for potential intensive care patients [29].
Deep NNs (DNN) include a large class of NNs, including AEs, convolutional neural networks
(CNN), and complex NNs which are presented in this work. The "deep" adjective means there are
multiple hidden layers in the network.
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) apply convolution to the dataset (usually images) to
detect high level features like edges and corners. It may also contain max pooling layers and
dense layers at the end of the network. A popular CNN is Alexnet which achieved state-of-the-art
accuracy in 2012 on the imagenet dataset [32].
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AEs are NNs that first encodes data and then decodes it back into the original data. This allows
the network to learn a compression of the data while optimizing for the minimal loss of information
in the process. Many methods use the AEs compressed representation of the data for the purpose
of dimensionality reduction and feature selection.
Complex NNs have complex-valued weights and activation functions. This greatly expands the
possible representation space of the network parameters [52, 17].
Support vector machines (SVM) attempt to separate the inputs using a learned hyperplane.
Many datasets cannot be linearly separated, though it is possible to avoid that issue by first
projecting the data using a kernel before learning an optimal hyperplane. SVMs have been applied
in many important applications, with one example being facial recognition [43]
2.4 Zero-Shot Learning
ZSL attempts to correctly classify unseen classes of data that were not seen in the training
dataset. This is closely related to one-shot learning where one example of each unseen class is
available during training. Typically in ZSL, extraneous semantic information is available for the
unseen classes. For example, the unseen class of "zebra" contains the semantic labels of "black",
"white", and "striped". As the network learns these semantic labels from other classes, it can then
transfer that knowledge to recognize a zebra in the testing phase, even though it was not trained on
any zebras in the training dataset. Mathematically, ZSL can be defined as follows:
Zero-Shot Learning: Denote DCA = {(G8, H8)}, for 8 = 1, 2, · · · , #CA , as the training data set
consisting of #CA labeled data samples. Assume that these #CA training samples belong to a set of
#B seen classes: CCA = {2CA8 }, for 8 = 1, 2, · · · , #B. Also, denote DC4 = {GC48 }, for 8 = 1, 2, · · · , #C4,
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as a test data set, and each data sample GC4
8
belongs to either one of the seen classes from CCA or one
of the unseen classes from CC4 = {2C48 }, for 8 = 1, 2, · · · , #D, where CCA ∩ CC4 = ∅. Then, the goal
of ZSL is to train a classifier that can predict class labels of all testing data samples in DC4.
Although in cases such as wireless classification, meaningful semantic labels cannot be curated
beforehand. It then falls toNNs to learn features that can differentiate unseen classes into reasonable
clusters.
Once these features are learned, clustering is required to separate the dataset accordingly.
Clustering is an unsupervised learning method which groups data points according to a similarity
metric, such as their Euclidean distance and their density. K-means clustering assigns clusters
based on euclidean distance from k randomly selected centroids. For many cases, it is unknown an
optimal value to choose for k, though a useful heuristic is the "elbow" method where the variance of
the data is plotted against the number of clusters [50]. A useful value for k is found in the "elbow"
of the graph where most of the variance is explained for the least amount of clusters chosen, and
greater values of k result in diminishing returns.
Density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN) is another clustering
algorithm, though this method relies on a closeness parameter n and density (minPts) as opposed to
a pre-specified value k for the number of clusters [20]. For every point, if it is has minPts neighbors
within n-distance, it is considered part of that cluster with those neighbors. Points without a
sufficient amount of neighbors are considered noise.
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CHAPTER III
CLASSIFYING WIFI PHYSICAL FINGERPRINTS USING COMPLEX DEEP LEARNING
3.1 Abstract
Wireless communication is susceptible to security breaches by adversarial actors mimicking
Media Access Controller (MAC) addresses of currently-connected devices. Classifying devices by
their “physical fingerprint” can help to prevent this problem since the fingerprint is unique for each
device and independent of the MAC address. Previous techniques have mapped the WiFi signal
to real values and used classification methods that support solely real-valued inputs. In this paper,
four new deep neural networks (NNs) are implemented for classifying WiFi physical fingerprints:
a real-valued deep NN, a corresponding complex-valued deep NN, a real-valued deep CNN, and
the corresponding complex-valued deep convolutional NN (CNN). Results show state-of-the-art
performance against a dataset of nine WiFi devices.
3.2 Introduction
In order to classify the “physical fingerprint”, only the preamble of each wireless signal is used.
The preamble for the 802.11a/g wireless protocol can be broken down into three subcomponents:
the Short Training Field (STF), the Long Training Field (LTF), and the Signal (SIG). This provides
information regarding synchronization and data length (or how to decode and howmuch to decode).
Importantly, information on the MAC address is absent, making it invariant to MAC-address
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spoofing. Sampling at 20 MHz with a software-defined radio (SDR), the preamble is located in
the first 400 samples of each signal as shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Preamble of a wireless signal in the 802.11a/g protocol. STF=Short Training Field,
LTF=Long Training Field, and SIG=Signal.
Herein, real-valued and complex-valued deep neural networks (DNNs) and deep convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) are investigated to classify WiFi preamble signals. The contributions in
this work to the physical device fingerprinting research area are:
1. A high-performance real-valued DNN has been developed and validated.
2. A complex-valued DNN that mirrors the architecture of the corresponding real-valued DNN
has been developed and validated.
3. A high-performance real-valued deep CNN has been developed and validated.
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4. A complex-valued deep CNN that mirrors the architecture of the corresponding real-valued
deep CNN has been developed and validated.
5. All four networks show performance that is at or above state-of-the-art methods for physical
device fingerprinting.
This section will discuss some basics of NNs and support vector machines (SVMs) and discuss
previous methods in device fingerprinting analysis.
3.3 Device Fingerprinting
Device fingerprinting relies on hardware devices having a unique digital transmission signa-
ture [30, 4, 21, 10, 46]. Radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting is challenging due to multipath and
channel fading effects, component aging and temperature effects on electronics [46, 21], as well
as hardware related imperfections and differences between individual units that cause modulation
errors and artifacts [9]. There are several survey papers on this topic as device fingerprinting is an
active area of interest [37, 10, 21, 7, 57, 22, 59, 54, 39, 23, 2, 5].
Over the past several years, a number of methods have been proposed for device fingerprint-
ing [4, 21]. A common approach is to rely on the usage of RF technology. For example, many
RF identification systems (RFIDs) are used in a wide variety of applications due to their resistance
to multipath effects and the complexities of indoor systems [21]. One method, in particular, takes
advantage of RF technology by using Bayesian change detectors to find RF fingerprints [53]. How-
ever, performance is dependent on specific equipment, and the corresponding energy consumption
may be prohibitive in certain settings. Chen et al. utilized infinite hidden Markov random fields for
device fingerprinting [12]. Lanze et al. used RF clock skew to analyze RF fingerprints [33]. Some
proposed solutions utilize the transient signal for analysis. Klein et al. performed a sensitivity
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study using two different techniques [27]. Rehman et al. examined the energy envelope of signal
transients for RF fingerprint extraction [45]. Klein et al. utilized wavelet transforms to analyze RF
fingerprints [28].
A mobile approach to fingerprinting has also been investigated. Khullar and Dong opted for
a client-server approach using cell phones to scan and extract data from the WiFi access points.
Afterward, the collected data is processed through SVMs, in order to train and test their system [24].
They found that adding temporal features greatly enhanced location prediction accuracies. Suski
et al. put forth a digital fingerprint classifier system. The system first estimated the instantaneous
amplitude, phase for each time sample and then estimated the transient start-up location [48].
Based on the transient location, they extracted statistical and parametric features from the signal
and applied Fisher’s linear discriminant analysis and spectral correlation. They achieved about
83% and 93% overall localization accuracies using spectral correlation and multiple discriminant
accuracy, respectively, with three classes and a 6 dB signal to noise ratio. Padilla et al. utilized
principal components analysis and partial least squares regression to classify digital fingerprints.
They classified ten different devices and the best results were about 94% overall accuracy [41].
Brik et al.’s Passive RAdiometric Device Identification System (PARADIS) approached fin-
gerprinting by specifically identifying hardware modulation differences such as IQ encoder errors,
self-interference, frequency errors and amplitude clipping [9]. They tested their system on a rel-
atively large set of data (138 different devices). Their approach works in the modulation domain
by estimating the IQ origin offsets , frequency differences, Sync correlation behavior, magnitude
error and phase error between ideal and observed data over multiple symbols in a frame. An
Agilent 89641S vector signal analyzer was used to capture the data. They achieved excellent
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performance of about 99.6% overall accuracy. However, their approach requires sensitive and very
costly equipment ($100 range) to estimate the error data and many frames to perform analysis.
Rehman et al. has examined low-end and high-end receivers, and concludes that low-end receivers
(SDRs) require a higher SNR to achieve good performance compared to high-end receivers [44].
High-end receivers definitely have a performance advantage over low-end SDRs.
Many NN are called deep networks or DNNs, because they have many layers. DNNs have
been used successfully in many areas including image processing, remote sensing, etc. [6]. A
special class of DNNs is a CNN. A CNN is loosely based on the human and primate visual system.
A typical CNN operates on imagery and usually employs multiple groups 2D masks followed by
pooling and some nonlinear activation such as a rectified linear unit (relu). Usually, at the tail
end of the network, there are some fully connected (Dense) layers followed by a softmax layer for
classification.
Recently, DNNs and CNNs have been applied for RF fingerprint analysis. For example, using
2D radio maps as inputs, Jang and Hong developed a system using a CNN for indoor localization
[23]. An attractive feature of CNNs is that they have fewer parameters than DNNs; consequently,
using a CNN allows for improved execution times and offers more sensitivity to power fluctuations
caused by multipath effects. They used computer access points (APs) to collect data and analyzed
the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values. They transformed the RSSI vector by adding
some padding data and reshaping it into an image then applied a deep CNN. Their goal was
to estimate the building ID and floor in the building, and they achieved about 95% accuracy.
Nowicki and Wietrzykowski proposed using DNNs to facilitate learning from the data rather
than tedious hand-tuning for fingerprinting [40]. Specifically, they used a diabolo-shaped stacked
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autoencoder (AE) for dimensionality reduction. They also utilized RSSI information and analyzed
the UJIIndoorLoc dataset [51], which contains 21,048WiFi scans recorded by 25 Android devices.
The AE inputs 520 RSSI values in the dataset. Their system examined results on building and
floor localization, and achieved about 91% accuracy on the test subset. Merchant et al. used three
deep learning networks with exponential activation units (ELUs) [14] to recognize IEEE 802.15.4
devices with about 92.3% overall accuracy [38].
3.4 Neural Networks
NNs are loosely based on human neurons. Each fully-connected neuron accepts inputs and
calculates a dot product of the inputs and adds a bias term. The neuron output is the processed
with a linear or non-linear function called the activation function. A standard DNN is composed
of many interconnected layers of neurons. A process called backpropagation is used to adjust the
neuron weights and bias terms. This process is called training the network, and there exist several
training methods in the literature; herein, the Adam (adaptive moment estimation) method [26] is
used for network training.
Given sufficient depth and appropriate non-linearities, NNs can learn any continuous function to
any given desired precision [15]. This propertymakesNNs an attractive choice formachine learning
and signal classification. However, NNs must also contend with the problem of overtraining. To
mitigate this, the network size and complexity can be adjusted, and dropout layers can be utilized.
Dropout layers randomly set some specified fraction of these inputs to zero during training. In
most cases, this forces the network to generalize better. During the inference phase (giving the
network testing data), all of the signals are passed through the dropout layer.
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3.4.1 Complex NN
Complex NNs are less common in the literature and it seems likely that there exists only
one implemented example [52, 17]. One may expect they are uncommon because most deep-
learning networks operate on real-valued data such as images or time sequences. Radar data and
receiver data in communication systems are instances where the data is inherently complex, and
these systems are beginning to implement deep learning, but even then, oftentimes these systems
transform the complex data and utilize real-valued networks. Moreover, there is a very significant
amount of software available for deep learningwith real-valued network, such as Tensorflow, Keras,
PyTorch, Matlab’s deep learning toolbox, etc. These heavily-used systems mostly provide support
for real-valued networks, so it is natural that their might be a scarcity of choices for complex-valued
networks.
Unfortunately, this implementation is a poor fit for the application. While this complex
NN can process complex data internally, its layers accept only real data as inputs. Moreover, a
critical function, ComplexConv1D, does not support the same input shape as TF’s one-dimensional
convolution layer, Conv1D. In TF, the input tensor is formatted as (None, data_vector_size,
1), where None indicates that TF can select the batch size. However, ComplexConv1D takes
inputs (None, data_vector_size). Consequently, TF Conv1D was used as the first layer in
the complex CNN.
A typical real-valued NN might use a rectified linear unit (relu) operator to provide a non-




G G ≥ 0
0 G < 0
, (3.1)
where G is a real-valued variable. However, the real-valued relu is not appropriate for a complex-
valued input. One suggested replacement is called the “modrelu” [56]. The modrelu utilized for a
complex value I with real-valued parameter 1 is
<>3A4;D (I) = A4;D ( |I | + 1) I|I | . (3.2)
Herein, the modrelu is modified slightly to prevent division by zero. The Keras code is listed in
Appendix A and the modrelu used herein (with Y = 1.0× 10−12), which is a small value utilized to
prevent dividing by zero. Other values could have been chosen as well. The modified modrelu as
shown below in eq. (3.3)
<>3A4;D (I) = A4;D ( |I | + Y + 1) I|I | + Y . (3.3)
The complex networks was difficult to train using the suggested modrelu parameter of 1 = −0.5,
so instead 1 = 0.01 was used.
3.5 Support Vector Machines
A SVM is a shallow-learning methods that uses an objective function to find an optimal
separating hyperplane, either in the input data space or in the kernel space, that best separates
the data samples. A linear SVM learns an optimal separating hyperplane from the training data,
and this decision boundary is then applied to the testing data. If the data are slightly non-linearly
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separable, slack variables can be used. However, if the data are highly nonlinear, then the linear
SVM will provide sub-optimal results. The second approach is to utilize kernel machines, which
project the data into a nonlinear space (when designed correctly this space will make the data
nearly linearly separable) and then use a linear SVM in the projected space. The non-linear SVM
is called a kernel SVM.
Herein, the radial basis function (RBF) kernel, which has one parameter that controls the RBF
variance, was utilized. The SVM itself has a cost parameter, which is the penalty incurred during
optimization for classification errors. The rfb kernel SVM thus has two hyperparameters, the cost
 and the RBF kernel size. The RBF kernel with two input vectors x and y is






The scikit SVM [42], which is a wrapper around libsvm [11], was used.
3.6 Methods
3.6.1 Development Environment
Herein, Keras [13] and Tensorflow (TF) [1] are used for implementing and testing the various
NN architectures. Anaconda [3] was utilized to install the required packages as shown in Appendix
A.10.
TF 2 was utilized with graphical processing unit (GPU) support for faster training. TF GPU





To collect the signals for this dataset, IEEE 802.11a/g WiFi traffic were captured from nine
different devices: Five WiFi routers, a Google Pixel 2XL, a Samsung Galaxy J2 Prime, an Oppo
R11, and a Blackberry Curve 3G 9300 phone. This variety of transmitters was intended to prove the
efficacy of the radio fingerprinting process. A USRP B210 SDR was used to collect the complex
data using GNURadio [19]. The USRP B210 offers many desirable features for this experiment,
such as a frequency range of 70 MHz - 6GHz, instantaneous bandwidth of 200 KHz - 56 MHz,
sampling rates up to 61.44 MS/s, and receiver front-end gains of up to 76dB. Ultimately, traffic
was captured at a 20 MHz sampling rate for approximately two minutes.
Building off ofBloessl’sWiFi receiver [8], an autocorrelation function detects the STF sequence
of the WiFi frame based on its periodicity. Then, the receiver saves a copy of the raw frame with
a generated counter and attaches that same counter to the original. The original continues being
processed until the MAC address can be extracted and saved to file with the counter.
There are cases where the MAC address cannot be extracted; for example, due to a corrupted
frame. When collecting data, any frames where such an error occurs were thrown out. Additionally,
frames containing an all-zero MAC address were removed. However, there were still frames where
the noise was constant and cyclical over the whole frame, as opposed to just the STF sequence of
a normal frame. This is one reason to explain why the autocorrelation function categorized it as
a normal WiFi frame. Thus, any frames whose maximum correlation was not 1 higher than the
average autocorrelation were filtered out.
When recording data, the first sample was flagged if its amplitude was greater than 0.05,
keeping the next 400 samples which represent the preamble. The amplitude constant was set
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empirically based on the receiver noise characteristics. Signals that had a preamble zeroed-out
midway through were discarded. Signals fromwireless devices that provided less than 90 instances
each were disposed. The remaining signals were split into real and imaginary components, leading
to a signal with 800 real samples representing 400 complex samples.
Additionally, approximately 0.1% of signals were not wireless preambles, but still passed the
autocorrelation threshold by coincidentally having the same periodicity of the preamble’s STF.
These were thrown out manually. This dataset contained preambles of nine wireless devices with
about 100 instances each.
3.6.3 Data Preprocessing
The data was collected using an SDR, and verifiedmanually. This data is IQ data. The preamble
consists of 400 complex samples. Most NNs are not designed to ingest complex data. As such,
there are several options available to the network designer. One option is to encode the complex
data as in eq. 3.5 by interleaving the real and the imaginary for each complex sample.
x = [' {G0} , " {G>} , ' {G1} , " {G1} , · · · , ' {G#−1} , " {G#−1}]) . (3.5)
Here, ' {G} and " {G} denote the real and imaginary portions of G, respectively, the superscript
) denotes a transpose operator, and # is the data vector size (400 complex samples). Herein, the
real imaginary encoding method shown in eq. 3.5 is utilized.
NNs can be sensitive to the data ranges. To normalize the data, the maximum values of the real
and complex data were used. The data was normalized by dividing all samples by the maximum
amplitude plus 0.1 for overhead. The normalized data was randomly shuffled and split into three
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disjoint datasets: training (60 %), validation (10 %) and testing (30 %). The data splitting kept
the same approximate class ratios in each split. In the experiments, the network was run ten times,
each time preprocessing, randomizing, and splitting the data.
Finally, since there were not enough training samples for the network sizes, data augmentation
was used. For each data vector, ten new samples were created by taking the original vector and
adding a random constant phase shift to every interleaved sample prior to processing by eq. 3.5.
That is, a single phase offset was applied to the complex data. The rationale is the phase of the data
is inherently unknown, so this accounts for the uncertainty in this parameter while also providing
augmented data samples for the system.
3.6.4 Network Architectures
Several network architectures are investigated for their ability to distinguish different phone
signatures. Herein, four NN architectures are examined: (1) a deep, real-valued NN, (2) a deep,
complex-valued NN, (3) a deep, real-valued CNN, and (4) a deep, complex-valued CNN.
3.6.4.1 Complex-valued and Real-valued DNNs
Herein, two DNNs are analyzed, a real-valued DNN (DNN-R1) and a complex-valued DNN
(DNN-C1). The network architectures for the DNN-R1 and DNN-C1 networks are shown in Tables
3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Keras codes for these two networks is given in Appendix A. In addition,
to provide comparison methods to previous methods in the literature, a kernel SVMwas utilized to
provide a baseline. Dense is a TF fully-connected layer. The rate for a dropout layer is the fraction
of entries that are randomly zeroed during each training minibatch. The number of classes is .
The Abs layer calculates the absolute value of the complex input and casts to TF float32 datatype.
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Table 3.1: Architecture of DNN-R1.  is the number of classes.
Layer Size Options
Input (None, 800)
Dense 800 relu activation
Dense 200 relu activation
Dense 50 relu activation
Dropout 0.50 rate
Dense C softmax
Table 3.2: Architecture of DNN-C1.  is the number of classes.
Layer Size Options
Input (None, 800)
ComplexDense 800 modrelu activation
ComplexDense 200 modrelu activation




3.6.4.2 Complex-valued and Real-valued CNNs
The network architectures of the complex-valued CNNs are shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The
CNN network uses 32 filters of size 12 followed by 2 × 2 max pooling and 64 filters of size 3,
followed by two 2 × 2 max pooling layers. A dropout layer with loss rate 0.5 is used to mitigate
overtraining. The data are flattened and then passed through two 32-neuron fully connected (dense)
layers and a final dropout layer before the softmax activation layer. The network CNN-C1 is the
complex equivalent of CNN-R1. The main differences are the second set of convolution layers
are complex, and the two fully connected layers after the flattening layer are also complex. The
first layer is a regular Conv1D, since the ComplexConv1D implementation was not able to accept
inputs compatible with the rest of the network. Also, a complex dense layer of size  has 2 
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components (one each for real and complex), so the final layer would have 2 outputs, which did
not match the dataset with nine classes. For that reason, the last softmax layer is a real-valued fully
connected layer.
Table 3.3: Architecture of CNN-R1.  is the number of classes.
Layer Size Options
















Dense 32 relu activation
Dense 32 relu activation
Dropout rate 0.5
Dense  softmax activation
3.6.5 Network Sizes
One important consideration for any DNN or CNN is the total number of trainable parameters.
This affects the network performance as well as sets requirements on the minimum size of the
training set. Table 3.5 shows the overall number of parameters for each network. From the table,
there are a few more layers in DNN-C1 due to the conversion to absolute value. Also, in terms of
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trainable parameters, CNN-C1 is about double the size of CNN-R1, which is expected, since the
ComplexConv1D will have double parameters to handle real and imaginary numbers. The CNN
networks are much smaller and perform relatively well.
3.6.6 Training parameters
Table 3.6 lists the training parameters for each network. The term “None” in the input size
is the encoding TF uses to allow batches to be any size. The number of training epochs and
batch sizes were adjusted to provide strong performance results while minimizing overtraining.
It is hard to directly compare to other classification results in the literature since the datasets
are different. The best results in the literature are currently PARADIS [9], but if you consider
the very expensive hardware required for their system versus the an inexpensive SDR solution,
state-of-the-art performance was achieved in device fingerprinting classification.
3.7 Results and Discussion
In this study, four NN’s were compared: A real-valued DNN (DNN-R1) and it’s complex-
valued counterpart (DNN-C1), a real-valued CNN (CNN-R1) and it’s complex-valued counterpart
(CNN-C1), and a RBF-SVM. To optimize the SVM parameters, a parameter sweep was performed
across the penalty parameter and the RBF size. Fig. 3.2 shows the results of the parameter sweep
for training (unaugmented dataset). Based on these results, the RBF standard deviation parameter
was selected as 4.096 and the cost as 38.0. The overall results are tabulated in Table 3.7. The
results show the overall accuracies for the raw complex data and the FFT-processed complex data.
The best results were obtained with DNN-C1 on the FFT-processed data, achieving 98.81% overall
accuracy. Network DNN-R1 was a close second with 98.14% overall accuracy on the raw complex
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data. The SVM had the next best at 96.88% overall accuracy, followed by CNN-R1, with 96.06%
overall accuracy.
Figure 3.2: SVM parameter sweep over the kernel size and loss parameters. Individual values in
each square represent the percent accuracy achieved by the SVM averaged over ten runs. Lighter
colors mean better results. Best viewed in color.
From these results, it is seen that DNN-C1, the complex-valued version of DNN-R1, slightly
outperformed real-valued network for the FFT-processed data. Furthermore, in all cases except
DNN-R1 (which was very close), the FFT-processed data gave better results. This was expected,
since the time-domain data can have phase shifts. A delay in the time domain would just induce a
phase shift in the FFT domain.
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Table 3.8 shows the testing average confusion matrix for CNN-C1 over ten runs. Classes 0 -
4 are routers, class 5 is a Blackberry Curve, 6 is an Oppo R11, 7 is a Google Pixel 2XL and 8
is a Samsung Galaxy J2 Prime. The most confusion was found for class 4, which the classifier
confused between the other routers. There was a small amount of confusion between classes 5, 6,
and 7.
3.8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, four networks were created that provide state-of-the-art performance for device
ID fingerprinting based on the 400-sample preamble. Very high classification accuracies were
obtained for all of the proposed networks, especially DNN-R1. For data captured via SDR, state-
of-the-art RF classification performance was achieved. It was also demonstrated that complex NN
are feasible alternatives for complex-valued signal processing. Finally, in almost all cases, there
were performance gains by pre-processing the signals with a FFT.
Future work includes testing on a larger set of devices, implementing a complex NN that
natively handles complex inputs, testing different network architectures and optimizing via a genetic
algorithm. Furthermore, more training samples can benefit larger networks, so it is desirable to
perform a large-scale data collection. Finally, it would be beneficial to investigate modifying the
complex NN 1D convolution to be a drop-in replacement for a real-valued TF 1D convolution.
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Table 3.4: Architecture of CNN-C1.  is the number of classes.
Layer Size Options

















ComplexDense 32 modrelu activation
ComplexDense 32 modrelu activation
Dropout rate 0.5
Dense C softmax activation








Table 3.6: Training parameters and settings for the DNN and CNN architectures.
Network DNN-R1 DNN-C1 CNN-R1 CNN-C1Parameter
Optimizer Adam Adam Adam Adam
Learning rate 2.0e-3 2.0e-3 2.0e-3 2.0e-3
Data vector size (#) 800 800 800 800
Input Size (None,#) (None,#) (None,# ,1) (None,# ,1)
Epochs 6 67 57 57
Batch size 100 500 725 725
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Table 3.7: Experiment results showing overall test accuracies in percent. Best results for each
method are shown in bold text.
Method Complex Data(No FFT)
Complex Data
(FFT Processed)
Real-valued NN (DNN-R1) 98.14 98.01
Complex-valued NN (DNN-C1) 96.09 98.81
Real-valued CNN (CNN-R1) 95.20 96.06
Complex-valued CNN (CNN-C1) 92.63 93.95
SVM 95.31 96.88
Table 3.8: Overall average confusion matrix for the testing data for DNN-C1 over ten runs. The
true values are in columns, and the network classifier outputs are in rows. The bold diagonal
elements are correctly classified.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 1333.3 0.0 0.0 2.4 7.0 0.0 9.6 0.0 0.0
1 1.1 1363.0 3.9 0.0 7.4 5.6 0.0 0.0 6.3
2 1.1 0.0 1375.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6 5.4
3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1376.9 0.0 6.4 0.0 8.8 0.0
4 13.2 3.1 7.0 6.7 1266.1 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.90
5 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 2.1 1065.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
6 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 901.4 5.1 0.0
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.2 0.0 1069.5 0.0
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1029.4
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CHAPTER IV
IDENTIFYING UNLABELED WIFI DEVICES WITH ZERO-SHOT LEARNING
4.1 Abstract
Inwireless networks,MAC-address spoofing is a common attack that allows an adversary to gain
access to the system. To circumvent this threat, previous work has focused on classifying wireless
signals using a “physical fingerprint”, i.e., changes to the signal caused by physical differences
in the individual wireless chips. Instead of relying on MAC addresses for admission control,
fingerprinting allows devices to be classified and then granted access. In many network settings,
the activity of legitimate devices—those devices that should be granted access—may be dynamic
over time. Consequently, when faced with a device that comes online, a robust fingerprinting
scheme must quickly identify the device as legitimate using the pre-existing classification, and
meanwhile identify and group those unauthorized devices based on their signals.
This paper presents a two-stage Zero-Shot Learning (ZSL) approach to classify a received
signal originating from either a legitimate or unauthorized device. In particular, during the training
stage, a classifier is trained for classifying legitimate devices. The classifier learns discriminative
features and the outlier detector uses these features to classify whether a new signature is an outlier.
Then, during the testing stage, an online clustering method is applied for grouping those identified
unauthorized devices. This approach allows 42% of unauthorized devices to be identified as
unauthorized and correctly clustered.
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4.2 Introduction
There is a need to separate legitimate from unauthorized devices using a mix of both supervised
and unsupervised learning using ZSL. Once separated, the system needs to further isolate each
unauthorized device into its own cluster. This will allow specific information on each unauthorized
device to be available for further purposes such as localization of individual devices and method
of attack.
In the online setting, there is only access to legitimate devices beforehand for training; therefore,
labels exist for legitimate devices, but not for unauthorized ones. It follows that supervised model
cannot be solely used; however, to exclusively use an unsupervisedmethod would be throwing away
useful information about available legitimate devices. This motivates the use of ZSL, which is a
form of semi-supervised learning where it is possible to leverage information regarding observed
classes (legitimate devices) in order to better separate unseen classes (unauthorized devices) into
their own clusters. Figure 4.1 illustrates how generalized zero-shot learning applies to this specific
use case.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of generalized zero-shot learning for this test case.
It is common to use additional semantic information to aid classification of unknown classes
(such as “black, white, stripes” to classify “zebra”). Unfortunately, in this case, there is not
meaningful semantic descriptions for wireless devices. The general form of ZSL without using
additional semantic information is as follows:
1. Feature extraction: learning discriminative features helps identify outliers and cluster unseen
classes.
2. Outlier detection: outliers will represent unknown/unauthorized devices.
3. Clustering of outliers: outliers will consist mostly of unknown/unauthorized devices, which
there are no labels for; therefore, there is a need to separate each device into it’s own cluster.
Here, the main contributions are (i) identifying features of wireless data that lend themselves
to outlier detection, and (ii) finding a different set of features more suited for clustering unseen
devices.
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4.3 Background and Related Work
The problem of identifying unknown devices can be formulated as a ZSL problem where
the seen classes (i.e., legitimate devices) in the training data set and the unseen classes (i.e.,
unauthorized devices) to be classified in the test data set are disjoint. Mathematically, the ZSL can
be defined as follows:
Zero-Shot Learning: Denote DCA = {(G8, H8)}, for 8 = 1, 2, · · · , #CA , as the training data set
consisting of #CA labeled data samples. Assume that these #CA training samples belong to a set of
#B seen classes: CCA = {2CA8 }, for 8 = 1, 2, · · · , #B. Also, denote DC4 = {GC48 }, for 8 = 1, 2, · · · , #C4,
as a test data set, and each data sample GC4
8
belongs to either one of the seen classes from CCA or one
of the unseen classes from CC4 = {2C48 }, for 8 = 1, 2, · · · , #D, where CCA ∩ CC4 = ∅. Then, the goal
of ZSL is to train a classifier that can predict class labels of all testing data samples in DC4.
Unlike many traditional machine learning methods which focus on classification problems
where all classes are available in the training data set, ZSL requires incrementally learning and
identifying new unseen classes during the testing stage. Many ZSL algorithms have been developed
for the past decade with a wide range of applications in computer vision, robotics, and natural
language processing. The rest of this section presents a brief review of related works in zero-shot
learning, while interested readers can be referred to a more comprehensive survey of the literature,
such as Wang et al.[55].
A ZSL algorithm typically falls into the following two categories: instance-based methods
and classifier-based methods. While the former aims to leverage labeled instances for learning
classifiers of unseen classes, the latter focuses on the learning of classifiers directly upon instances
from both seen and unseen classes. Existing classifier-based methods usually apply a one-vs-rest
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scheme to build classifiers for each class, and three types of approaches have been developed:
correspondence methods [18, 34, 35], relationship methods [31, 58, 60], and combination methods
[47]. The instance-based approaches focus on the building of labeled instances for the unseen
classes through projection, instance-borrowing, and synthesizing. Note that most existing zero-
shot learning methods are built by exploring the relations of seen and unseen classes in their
attributes and semantics. While these methods perform well in many image-analysis tasks, where
meaningful semantics exist to describe instances, they would fail in this study of RF signal analysis
to identify unseen devices whose fingerprints are difficult to describe with explicit attributes.
This paper presents a two-stage approach to address this problem. During the training stage,
a classifier is first trained to learn discriminative features and recognize those legitimate devices.
During the online testing stage, with the learned features, an outlier detector is used to identify all
test instances belonging to the unseen classes, and apply a clustering algorithm which groups those
unseen class instances, i.e., outliers, in terms of their similarity in the feature space.
Density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN) is one such clustering
algorithm. This method uses two parameters: n which defines how close two datapoints need to
be and minPts which specifies the number of neighbors required [20]. For every point, if it is
has minPts neighbors within n-distance, it is considered part of that cluster with those neighbors.




To collect the dataset for this project, USRP B210 SDR and GNURadio were used. Building
off of Bastian Bloessl’s WiFi receiver [8], an autocorrelation function detects the STF sequence of
the WiFi frame based on its periodicity.
The magnitude of each complex signal was recorded, and due to noise, the first sample of
each signal that had an amplitude greater than 0.05 was flagged, keeping the next 400 samples
which represent the preamble. The threshold was empirically determined based on the noise levels
of the SDR. Signals that had a preamble zeroed-out midway through were discarded. Signals of
wireless devices that contained less than 90 instances each were thrown out, as having less would
cause insufficient training. The remaining signals were then scaled individually to unit norm using
Sklearn’s normalize function [42].
Additionally, approximately 0.1% of signals were not wireless preambles, but still passed
the autocorrelation threshold by coincidentally having the same periodicity of the preamble’s STF.
Such signals were discardedmanually. Ultimately, the dataset contained preambles of nine wireless
devices with approximately 100 instances each.
4.4.2 Models
Four neural network models were implemented for learning discriminative features in an either
supervised or unsupervised manner: convolutional neural network (CNN), multi-layer perceptron
(MLP), Autoencoder (AE), and Autoencoder with transductance (AE-transductance). These were
implemented using custom networks from the keras library [13] in Python with layer-specific code
available in Appendix A.7-9. All learning rates were set to their default values.
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Convolutional Neural Net. For the CNN, a one-dimensional convolutional layer was chosen.
Two-dimensional CNN’s are typical for image inputs in order to learn image-related features such
as edges and corners. On the other hand, a one-dimensional CNN is able to learn temporal features
in time-series data which is suited for the preamble signals. For both the CNN and the MLP below,
adagrad and categorical crossentropy were used for the optimizer and loss function, respectively.
Multi-layer Perceptron. As a base comparison against the CNN, an MLP was implemented
containing three Dense layers with 50 units separated by dropout layers with dropout parameter
set to 0.3. This means 30% of input units from the previous layer will be randomly zeroed during
training to help prevent overfitting. During testing, all layers are passed through the dropout layer.
Autoencoder. An eight-layer diabolo-shaped AE was implemented with 200, 100, 40, and 13
neurons in the encoder layers, and vice-versa for the decoder layers. The embedded layer of
size 13 was empirically determined to perform better than marginally smaller and greater values.
Particularly, “tanh” was used for the last layer’s activation function, mean absolute error for the
loss function, and Adamax for the optimizer as these scored highest for reconstruction error and
DBSCAN [20] clustering accuracy.
Autoencoder with Transductance An AE-transductance model was also implemented. All
parameters were similar to the regular AE except it was trained on all RF-signals as opposed to
only the legitimate devices. The motivation is to learn features of the unauthorized devices for
which no labels exist.
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4.4.3 Outlier Detection
In all cases, the legitimate devices encompassed five classes, leaving four unauthorized device
classes. All experiments were averaged over ten runs using a different selection of wireless devices
split between legitimate and unauthorized. Each of the networks were trained on 70% of the
legitimate devices, and the remaining 30% and all unauthorized devices were encoded in each
network for testing. Encoding for the CNN and MLP is defined as the :-layer output of each
network. Encoding for the AE is the middle layer output. These encoded signals were then passed
to a local outlier detector (LOD).
LOD is an unsupervised outlier detectionmethod that determines outliers by their distance from
clusters based on the density of the cluster, i.e., a datapoint is more likely to be labeled as an outlier
if it is far from a dense cluster as opposed to a sparse cluster. In order to leverage this unsupervised
method, the LOD was ran with all encoded training data and one of the encoded legitimate or
unauthorized devices. If the training data is classified as an outlier, that information is ignored
since there will be training data with labels in the online setting. If the one encoded legitimate or
unauthorized device is classified as an outlier, it is counted as an outlier. This was repeated until all
of the test set were classified as an outlier or not. In the study, Sklearn’s implementation of Local
Outlier Factor was used with a threshold over the negative outlier factor. The normal outlier factor
is determined by calculating the density of every point. Density is defined as the distance between
the point of interest and its k nearest neighbors. If a point has a much smaller density compared
to its neighbors, then it is considered an outlier. The negative outlier factor is the opposite of the
regular outlier factor, meaning that a smaller value implies normality because it has a larger density
and a larger value implies abnormality because it has a smaller density.
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4.4.4 Zero-Shot Learning
The DBSCAN clustering algorithm was used on encoded data of all trained networks due to its
ability to form complex-shaped clusters. DBSCAN also does not require knowing the exact number
of clusters which fits the use case since one would not know the exact number of unauthorized
devices in an online setting. Only encoded unauthorized devices are considered in order to compare
how well each network is able to learn general features of RF signals. This corresponds to the
typical ZSL setting where only the unknown classes are in the test set. Since DBSCAN is an
unsupervised method, a metric is needed in order to compare the performance of the models.
Since it is desirable to separate unseen classes into their own clusters, each unseen class will be
assigned the cluster that contains a majority of that unseen class. “Clustering accuracy” will then
be defined as the percent of each class that makes up their respective majority. For example, if 40
out of 100 signals are clustered into one cluster, and the rest are uniformly spread through several
other clusters, then a clustering accuracy of 40% is assigned.
Using sklearn’s implementation of DBSCAN, the epsilon parameter was initially set to a mini-
mum of the distance between all centroid pairs of the training data. This incorporates information
about the shape and size of the known training clusters in order to better cluster similar, but unseen,
test clusters. This minimum distance was scaled between one to five times its original value during
testing of clustering accuracy as higher or lower values were not shown to increase accuracy.
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4.4.5 Generalized Zero-Shot Learning
In a generalized zero-shot learning (GZSL) scheme, it is considered that the online testing stage
contains both unauthorized devices and legitimate devices. This should result in smaller accuracy
than obtained in the typical ZSL setting due to the test set containing both seen and unseen classes.
4.5 Results
Figure 4.2 shows the results for LOD using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves.
ROC curves show the rates of true positives (probability of detection) against the rates of false
positives (probability of false alarm) at different threshold settings. This means curves closer to
the top-left quadrant are better in the sense of having more true-positives and less false-positives.
In this case, the threshold varied between −1 and −1000 over the negative outlier factor in
LOD. As shown, the classifiers CNN and MLP outperformed the AE where the CNN scored
highest overall. To make this concrete, x-y location (0.1, 0.5) in Figure 4.2 represents a five-to-one
ratio of five correctly classified unauthorized devices for every one legitimate device incorrectly
classified as unauthorized. During training, the CNN scored an average of 91.52% while MLP
scored 90.41% implying higher training accuracy may have an affect on outlier detection.
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Figure 4.2: ROC curves for the selected models.
Experiments were conducted to evaluate the clustering performance of grouping devices during
the testing stage for both ZSL and GZSL settings. Since the CNN performed best in outlier
detection, those outliers were used as inputs for clustering in DBSCAN. In particular, the clustering
accuracy is reported in terms of the selection of the hyperparameter in DBSCAN clustering
algorithm, i.e., epsilon, in Figure 4.3. As shown, the AE outperforms the other models for both
ZSL and GZSL settings. Specifically, for ZSL, this clustering accuracy implies AE is able to
correctly group 46% of an unknown class on average. Meanwhile, Figure 4.3 also shows both AE’s
outperforming the CNN, and the AE-transductance providing no improvement over the AE.
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Figure 4.3: Clustering accuracies for both the ZSL and GZSL settings. As expected, clustering
in the ZSL setting performed marginally better than the GZSL due to not containing legitimate
devices in the mix. Both autoencoders performed better than the classification methods.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Work
ZSL and GZSL for wireless RF-signals were successfully implemented and validated, both
of which have not been attempted before in the literature. For the purpose of gathering enough
unauthorized RF-signals in order to classify them, an average clustering accuracy of 42% in the
GZSL setting was achieved. Whether this is sufficient for outlier detection depends on how many
RF-signals are required and how fault-tolerant the proposed model is to mis-clustered data.
Outlier detection performed best to identify unauthorized devices using features learned by
CNN-based classifiers, achieving a five-to-one legitimate-to-unauthorized device ratio. This ratio
tentatively seemed to improve with greater model accuracy implying that models that achieve closer
to 100% accuracy may show performance improvements in outlier detection; however, this may
only be the case if those models avoid overconfidence in the face of novel classes.
For clustering in both typical ZSL and GZSL settings, it appears that normal classification
models learn features that discriminate seen classes but do not generalize to previously unseen
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classes. Autoencoders show more promise and may be able to learn features that do generalize,
and larger datasets may further improve both autoencoders implemented. Additionally, supervised
autoencoders may be able to better incorporate labeled data for increased performance in both




This work presents state-of-the-art results for classification of wireless networks for both
complex and real-valued networks. This substantiates the claim that wireless physical fingerprints
are a viable metric for differentiating legitimate and unauthorized wireless devices. Additional
improvements were also found with preprocessing using the FFT.
Both ZSL and GZSL obtained non-trivial results in the novel application of wireless physical
fingerprints. The combination of outlier detection and clustering allowed a separation between
legitimate and unauthorized devices and further separation of unauthorized devices into their own
clusters. Specifically, a 42% average clustering accuracy was achieved in the GZSL setting; this
may be sufficient for further purposes such as localization depending on how many samples of the
unauthorized devices were captured and how many are required for localization. Higher clustering
accuracies would lower the amount of unauthorized device samples required to be captured.
5.1 Further Research
The dataset used included only nine devices with approximately 100 samples each. Gathering
a larger dataset in both device number and samples captured would be beneficial for testing the
generalization of the methods presented. A larger dataset on the order of 1000 samples per device
may benefit these DNNs. Extending the complex NN to accept complex-valued inputs may also
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improve performance. The data could be additionally be preproccessed by the short time fourier
transform and the wavelet transform instead of the FFT.
For both the ZSL and GZSL settings, classification models that obtain higher accuracies than
those presented in this work may learn features that generalize to previously unseen classes. Using
state-of-the-art outlier detection methods would also increase performance in the outlier detection
portion of ZSL and may also lead to enhanced feature selection. In this work, AEs were used for
feature selection, but they were unsupervised models. Modified AEs that allow usage of labeled
data may achieve greater clustering accuracies.
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from __future__ import absolute_import
from __future__ import division
from __future__ import print_function
# Tell python to find the complexnn directory
import sys
sys.path.append(r“path to complexnn”) # Put your path here
import complexnn
import numpy as np
import keras
import tensorflow as tf
from keras import models, optimizers, regularizers
from keras.models import Sequential
from keras.layers import Activation, Dropout, Dense, Flatten, Conv1D, Input, Layer
from keras.layers import MaxPooling1D
from keras.models import Model
from keras.utils import to_categorical
from tensorflow.python.keras import backend as K
from keras.metrics import categorical_accuracy
from datetime import datetime
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from packaging import version
from math import pi
from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split
from sklearn import svm












z = complexnn.dense.ComplexDense(800, activation=ModReLU, input_dim=data_vector_size)(z)
z = complexnn.dense.ComplexDense(200, activation=ModReLU)(z)
z = complexnn.dense.ComplexDense(50, activation=ModReLU)(z)
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za = complexnn.utils.GetAbs()(z)
za = tf.cast(za, dtype=tf.float32)
zd = Dropout(rate=0.60)(za)
outputs = Dense(num_classes, activation=’softmax’)(zd)
model =Model(inputs, outputs)
A.4 Keras code for CNN-R1
input_shape = (data_vector_size, 1)
model = Sequential()
model.add(Conv1D(32, 12, activation=’relu’, padding=’same’, strides=2, input_shape=input_shape))
model.add(MaxPooling1D(2))










A.5 Keras code for CNN-C1
input_shape = (data_vector_size, 1)
inputs = Input(shape=input_shape)
z = inputs
# Had to use regular Conv1D instead of ComplexConv1D for first layer to get network to work
z= (Conv1D(32, 12, activation=ModReLU, padding=’same’, strides=2, input_shape=input_shape))(z)
z = (MaxPooling1D(2))(z)






z = complexnn.dense.ComplexDense(32, activation=ModReLU)(z)
z = complexnn.dense.ComplexDense(32, activation=ModReLU)(z)
z = Dropout(rate=0.50)(z)
outputs = Dense(num_classes, activation=’softmax’)(z)
model =Model(inputs, outputs)
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A.6 ModReLU activation function
# ModReLU(z) = ReLU(|z| + b) * z / |z|
def ModReLU(z, b=0.01):
absz = K.abs(z) + 1.0e-12
out = K.relu(absz + b) * z / absz
return out
A.7 Keras code for CNN
input_shape = [data_vector_size]
model = Sequential()









A.8 Keras code for MLP
input_shape = Input(shape=(data_vector_size,))
l1 = Dense(50, activation=’relu’)(input_shape)
l1 = Dropout(rate=0.3)(l1)
l1 = Dense(50, activation=’relu’)(l1)
l1 = Dropout(rate=0.3)(l1)
l1 = Dense(50, activation=’relu’)(l1)
l2 = Dense(num_classes, activation=’softmax’)(l1)
model = Model(input_shape, l2)










autoencoder = Model(input_shape, decoded)
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encoder = Model(input_shape, encoded)
A.10 Anaconda installation code
conda create –name complex python=3.7.1 numpy=1.16.2
conda activate complex
conda install -c conda-forge packaging
conda install -c anaconda scikit-learn
conda install -c conda-forge keras




pip install -r requirements-nogpu.txt
pip install keras-complex
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